University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Department of Teaching,
Learning and Teacher Education

Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher
Education

May 2005

Design Bearings
Margaret A. Macintyre Latta
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Margaret.Macintyre.Latta@ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/teachlearnfacpub
Part of the Teacher Education and Professional Development Commons

Macintyre Latta, Margaret A., "Design Bearings" (2005). Faculty Publications: Department of Teaching,
Learning and Teacher Education. 29.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/teachlearnfacpub/29

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher
Education at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications: Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher Education by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Design Bearings
Margaret Macintyre Latta
'rbc use of the tern] "design" is previllent in educution talk (c.g., see the theme issue o f E(lr~ctltio/rnlRcscnrc/rcr, vol. 32, no. 1 (2003)). Surne of this talk tends ra
ciist design 11s representations manifested through applied method as ways to
solve ant1 address educational practices ancl issues (e.g., Constantine & Lockwood, 1909; 1)ick & Carey, 1990; lidelson, 2002; Kelly 81 Lesh, 2000). Within this
focus on representation an impulse for generality ancl commensurability secms
to clictatc; either tllc di~tilmust be seen to correspond to sorne external reality, or
the sul$ccts must agree (c.g., Ilrown, 1992; Brown & Campione, 1996; Cobb,
Confrcy, cliSessa, I.chrcr, &k Schauble, 2003; Collins, 1992; IIoadley, 2002). l3esign can become an act (hat reifies and totalizes what is present, and the fulurc,
that which is absent, different, possible, ant1 yet-to-be-achieved, disappears. Such
disregard for the future concerns me ant1 tells me the role of design in eclucation
is ncglccring its artistic roots antl traditions, potentially under~nining the
strengtlls that design offers eciucation. Certainly, arts-basecl educatinnnl researchers (e.g., Ililronc, 1995, 2001a, 200Ib; llarone & Eisner, 1997; Eisner, 1991,
1997, 1999) hi~vcfore-grounded these strengths, valuing the creation of an alternative reality, seeing ambiguity as productive, utilizing expressive, contextunlizcd, and vernacular language, suggesting and promoting empathy and insigl~ts
moving "towi~rcluncovering obscured cl~~cstions'"(Uaronc, 2001a, p. 25). But,
such thinking seems to be absent from much of the body of work recently coopting the term tlesign and in my opinion risks losing sight of the integral nature
of design vital within t l ~ cact of designing. Specifically, the loss of temporality
ancl interplay through reliance on concepts brought to bear, rather than bearings
found within the act of designing, will bc examined. 'To do so, I draw primarily
on the thinking of llcwcy (1931, 1938) and Hakhtin (1990, 1993) as both graund
their tl~inkingin the actudity of the creating act. The Aristotclinn notion ofrcpctitioil as pemeilting the act of designing, evoking an ex11loratory, restless movcment, is taken up as a means to see antl experience the strengrl~sof designing.
Ilepetition is not sirnply a methorlological, tl~eoretical,or philosophical notion,
but: a mol.al one. I suggest that the act ofdesigning demancls what Cayuto (1987)
calls a n "ethics oCcIisscmination." The act of designing entails a moral obligation
E&C/Education and Culture 21 (2) (2005):31-43 @ 31
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to the filture of our work, to gc~lerativity,to thc possibility thal what is ''wholly
other" (Caputo, 2000) might remain so, and resist bcing calcifietl into a rcpresentativc design.

The Act of Designing
Tlle act of designing assullles that one must enter as a clesigncr into such acts.
Attending to the act of designing within the act ol'designing and nc~tthe desigri
itself, becomes the focus. Co~ltrarily,design can be taken up as a rcyrcscntativc
form, assuming functionary, imposed roles. The rlangcr of calcifying clcsign
arises, Iiather, the artistic roots ant1 traditioils of design take up clcsign ils a yrocess enlerging out of the act. Design is always being yielcletl. It is the capacity to
see this yielding lnovelnent that is the strength of desigll and is undcrcsti~natccl.
Returning to the etylnological origin of design Srom the Latin rlCsig/tclrcmraning
to rtrark orit, I search lor the bearings upon which yiclcling dcsign clcpcnds, the
conditions of designing grounded in the designer's capacity to cvncomitiintly see
and act within the adapting, building, creating process of designing. It is this
search for bearings that I desire to gain greater access into, in orvlcr to rccognizc,
foster, and nurture the terms of design i11 others.
I turn to Uald~tin's(1990, 1993) early tiesthetic cssilys and J)cwcyls (1 934,
1938) later works to pursue the conditions of design. 'Though each writes from
their own perspective and context, both Bokhtin iultl L>cwcy ground thinking in
the creating process itself. Uearings/lived tern~scmcrgc for me Srom each thinker
that cultivates "the thinking in situations" (Albers, 1969, y. 3 5 ) which en,~blcs
seeing. In this way, both Uakhtin and L)cwcy help me to insist that dcsign must
be understood in ternis of human action. Thus, the act of tlcsigning is tdken 111)
throughout the paper as the act of knowing; the designing process of undcrstarding in relation to action itself. Uakhtin and Dewey provide ;I langl~ilgcdlilt
articulates the lerlns of design and allows ~ i i cto envision tlicsc terms witlliti tny
educational practices. Indeed, this is Dewey's (1904) claim, that this movtrrlicnt
I ~ U S be
L known before it can be directed (p. 21).
Searching with Bakhtin

Bakhtin (1993) en~phasizesthe uniqucncss and si~~gularily
of creating lirr each
~CI-SOII. Froin within the acr or riee~l,participatory tlririkirrg oricrlts inrlivitluals.
This f o c ~ on
~ s the act as il is happening ~lliikesit necessary 10 see t11c act not ils a
given conte~nylatedat a distance, but to see horn within, a talting into account of
the givenness, moment by moment. "And all thcsc molnalts, which makc up tlic
event in its totality, are present to him (sic) as something given iund as something
lo be achievcd conjoinlly" (p. 30). The si~nultiir~eous
nwilrcllcss of hot11 something given and so~nethingyet-to-be-achieved is crucial to the intent of 1);iklitin's attempt to describe the world in which the actlactor becomes ilw'lrc ofitself/him/herself; a catching of self in the act. I-Ie is clciir that it is not ilirned at
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clescribing the world produced by that act. It is through Bakhtin's thinking that I
realize that the concrete is not simply a step toward something else, but rather,
conco~nitantlya k~zowirlgof the present ancl how to meaningfully proceed. He
grounds the creating act in the unique human being, located spatially and temporally in the pllenomenology of self/other relations. Uakhtin portrays such entering into sell'/othcr re1atia1.r~as occurring through events to be lived out, enactetl, or achicvctl:
111 which

tile monients o f wlidt-is-giveu, and what-is-to-be-achieved, of
wllLlti+ dni1 wll;~to~lglitt o he, of being nnd v'llue, are insepurable. All
tllc.rc a[>str,~ctc,~tegorics,Ire here constituent ~nomentsof a certain living, corlcretc, ,111cl p'llpablc (intuitable) once-occurrent whole-an
event. (p. 32)
'I'hus thc crciitor lincls hirnll~crsclfin a space between what-is-given and what-isto-be-ilchieverl. Uakhtil~( 1990) further describes such a space as the problell~of
colrtrrtl, rrrtrtcrinl, and firnu; content Oeing what work is about, material being the
ubstr'lct milttcr out of which work is constructed, and form being
concrete
the rel~ltionsllipsin work between self, content, and materials (pp. 257-325).
Ilut, the problem of content, material, and form does not require a problem
strlvcr so much ,is the capacity 13akhtin (1993) terms nestlietic seeirlg. Aesthetic
sccing is cl~i~riictcrized
i\s il releasing or opening of one self to the present; an
immersion in im~nctliacy.It offers accounts of experienced space, timc, body,
and humCunrclC1tionsas they arc lived. 'Shere is an ebb and flow; a rl~ythmicqualreity to time that is not cletern~incdby external timerables. It requires listeni~~g,
sponding, and openness in what is heard and what is said. Such engagcrnenl
thrives on unfr)rcsccn 17ossibilities.Such a spacc places self clearly in the midst, as
cat~lystund struncling hoard. Bakl~tin(1993) explains: "What constitutes this center is the hum,~nbeink:: everything in this world acquires significance, meaning,
and value only in correli~tionwith man (sic)-as that which is human" (p. GI). In
other worcls, the ,~ctof creating is orientcd through actual experiencing, demanding interct.rnnection~hetween self and other. Balthtin (1993) filrther clarifies:
Cootcnt, after ,111, docs not f'lll into lily head like a rllcteor from another
world, co~~tinuing
to cxist there ils il self-enclosed and impervious frngment, as something tliat is not woven into the unitary fiibric of my emotios,~l-volitior~,~l,
my living and effective, thinking-expcriel~cing,in the
c,~p,~cit
y o f a11csscnti,~lmoment in tliiit thinlting-cxpcrie~~cing.
(p. 33)
Content comes to 131' nnticrstond within the act of participation in cvcnts themselves, thus ch,~r,~ctcrizcJils unique, livcd, embodied, and contextunl, wholly
clepcntlent on sclf-involvc~nent.Aesthetic seeing searches for the potential in
mi~terialsto pmvide direction, both shuping iuntl limiting inqui~y.Thc conncctinns fostcrcd are il catalyst to insights, giving the i11quiry meanil~gancl life. Tl~us,
Uakhtin (19C)O) tlcscrihes form ant! nlaterial as: "The form ofcontcnt, but a form
Volume 21(2) @ 2005
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which is realized in tlie material-is attached to tlie material, as it were" (p. 303).
So, for111 is i~nderstoodas the expression of activity. And, for111 very much includes "its creator within itself' (pp. 315-316). Uakhtin's description of the internally active human being as creator entering form through seeing, hearing,
evaluating, connecting, and selecting-takes life. "Fonn ceases to bc outside us
as perceived and cognidvely ordered material; it becomes an expression of a
value-related activity tliat penetrates content and transforn~sit" (p. 305). Thus,
the process is inseparable from the product. Uaklitin (1993) claims tliis rcquircs
participants: "Know liow not to detach their perfor~nedilct from its product,
but, rather how to relate bot21 of thcln to thc unity and unique context of life arid
seek tu dcterrniric them in tliat coiltext as iln indivisible unity" (p. 19).
l3aklitin (1990) suggests a language tliat expresses the flux, the movement
necessary to grapple in-between self, conlent, material, and form, f~rsingprocess
and product into an interdependent, ongoiilg unity. Within tliis iridivisiblc tuiity
Uaklitin introduces the language of aiis~uerability,o~~tsirlcrzuss,
and titrfitimlizobility
for describing involvement in the creating act. He portrays answerability arising
out of a fiindamcntal reciprocity between sclf and content, contini~i~lly
relating
to personal understandings and values. 13aklitin cxplains how tliis is not derived
from a iilechanical relationship of yarts to whole. "Tlie parts o f s ~ l c ha wl~olcare
contiguoits and touch each othcr, but in then~sclvestliey re~nainilli~11to cacli
other" (p. I). Rather, answerability is dependc~lton pcrsonal involvcmcnt. Such
involvement ~lecessitatcstaking "an axiologicill stand in every moment of onc's
lifc or t o position oneself with respect to values" (pp. 87-88). Uaklitin further
explai~isthat h e sees tliis living a ~ i dnioving "110t in a V~CLILIII~,
but in an intense
axiological atmosphere of responsible, answerable, indeterminatio~i"(p. 275).
Uaklitin's clai~iiis tliat answerability is not a given, but rather, is seen ils a task
to engagc in and with, through participation in the crcating proccss. An ctnotional commitlnent and involvement expressing what is pi~rticularand irreplaccable in each situated individual conies forth. Througli participation inclividuals question. By delibcrating and doing they becomc answerers; rcsyonsc
entails responsibility. The subject ~iiatterstarts to matter to individuals and
onc's distinctive~icssfrom others can become il catalyst to enlarged undcrstanriings a n d diverse thinlting. Uaklitin (1986) explains liow outsidc~icssniakcs this
possibIc. Outsidcness speaks to his interpretation of tlie self as a fully cmbodied
sell, a self that is constituted interrlependently with the other. Outsidcness is cxp c r i e ~ ~ c ctlirougli
d
an intcrdepenclence realized at boundaries wlicrc undcrstantlings come up against or meet another. Each nccds the other. A sclf-conscionsness
takes hold that is not ground in a solitary consciousness, but rillher a dcvcloping
greater consciousness oC otlier, others, and in turn, sclf. Thus, rlcithcr sclf nor
otlier are bound entities; they intcrminglc in a body-world rclalionsliip yiclding
an outsideness, belonging as much to tlie other as self. Tlicse new meanings are
te~ltative,reyrcscnting nloments of clarity but also blurred with unfinished or
incomplete thoughts. Participants nialte judgments dcrived largely on what sur-
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faces during process. This is the nature of Uakhtin's (1990) 11otion ofunfinalizabilty (pp. 121-1321. The interaction of self and other is ongoing and ulti~nately
unGniili~itble.There is openness to unasked for ancl u~lpredictablelearnings.
CIlange and tfiulsfor~llationare i~lwayspossible.
Searching with Dewey

TIle priniacy of inlelucrion portraycci by Dakhti~l(1993) is integral to Dewey's
( 1934, 1938) central philosophicul notion ofcxpcricr~cc,Dewey also finds that the
e of seeing that atldresses the experience
creative act offers a l i ~ ~ ~ g ~i ~ ni ldag way
from within experience. Ilewcy (1934) speaks of art as a creativc act offering:
"Living ancl concrete proof that lnan (sic) is capable of restoring conscious1y and
thus on the place of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse, and action
characteristic of the live creature" ( y , 25). Thus, art cxc~nplifiesa living experience, a consummation of a movement where a "conclusion is no separate and
intiependent thing" (p. 38). 'I'licrc is a wl~olenessthat n ~ u s tnot be simplified.
The wllolcncss is tlerived from IJewey's emphasis on an orgarlic sense ofexpericnce inhcrcnt in the constitution of what it means to be human-embodied
within ec~clio f us. Experience is the life that comprises the organic wbole-the
human being. 'I"11crc is it vital connection within experience to the past, present,
and fi~turc. 1)ewcy (1938) portrilys people living both in (ii~rernc~ion)and
through an environ~ncnt(n~rrtiirrrity)(1). 24). "Different situations succeed one
anothcr, but because of the principle of continuity sometliing is carried over
froln the earlier to the later one" (p. 44). The conceptio~lso f s i t u a t i o ~and
~ interaction arc insel~ari~ble.
"An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his
(sic) environment" (p. 41). The two principles of continuity and intcractio~?infcrccpt ancl rlriitc (13. 42). Ilewey (1934) emphasizes that experience cornes to be
"what it is because of tile cnrirc pattern to which it contributes and which it is
ilbsorbcd" (p. 295). 'I'hus exyerie~~ce
involves participants actively structurillg
what is encountered through active talrlcrgoirlg with an open, vulnerilble, receptive attitl~dcancl (loir~gtypified as rcspontling, organizing, and discerning. Dewey
(1934) explains that the interplay betwcc~iundergoing ancl doing is always evolving with beginnings and endings occurring throughout, thus: "An experiellce has
pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alteration,
but consists of them in relationship" (p. 295). Such interplay seems very similar
to the relationship Uakhtin conveys living in-between content, material, and
form; il relationship that both Llewey and Dakhtin identify as requiring seeing.
Dakhtin's notion of ncsllletic sccirig parallels Dewey's distinction betwee~lrecognition arid seeing. Itecognition is ahout labeling and categorizi~lg,but seeing entails receptivity, assuming a commitment to finding out about the ensuing interactions. I)cwcy's talk ofplqposc characterized as an attitude rather than a specific
or aim darifies the intents of this distinction: "The esserltial point is that. the
~ > i ~ p ogs1e. o ~ant1 take shape tllrougb the process of social intelligence" (p. 83).
Volume 21(2) Q 2005
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Cortlicclcrirlcss is discussed as the organizational thread thus Dewey claims: "We
have n o choice but to operate in accord with the pattern it (experience) provides
or else to neglect thc place of intellige~icein the development and control of a
living a n d moving experience" (p. 88). Dewey assulncs an active participant
adapting, building, and changing meaning in an ongoing conversation bclwccn
self and other very mucll etnbracing Uakhtin's notions of answerability, outsidcness, and unfinalizability. The implied unity and inovcment are critical to understanding Dewey's (1938) notion of experience as a rriaviiigjurcc. I-Ie clarifies:
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At thc sa111etinlc there is not
sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. , In an experience, flow is from
solncthing to something. As one part leads into anothel. and as one pilrt
carries o n what went before, each gains distinctiveness in itself. The enduring whole is diversified by successive phascs that arc emphases of its
varied colors. (p. 45)

.

Inherent Conditions and Consequences of Design
Uakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) corlvey like conditions found within the
actuality of 111e crcating act that are worth paying closcr attention to regarding
the nature of dcsign. Both Uakhtin and Dewey arguc that it is inlpossiblc to scyaratc parts away from the entirety of the act of crcating meaning. It is experienced
as connected, all parts linked in relation to the vital move~ncntof the wholc, belonging to the self and situation concerned in this movement. In this WCIY both
portray the act of creating meaning positio~li~lg
purkicipcltors to be wholly involved. Bakhtin conveys a space crcated that positions participants in-betwecn
content, material, and form pervaded by his (1990) notions of answerability,
outsidencss, and ~~nfinalizability.
And as Dcwcy conveys, momentary semblanccs
of meaning come to be. But such semblances are dynamic; parts arc always
evolving ant1 uilfoldillg into further semblnnces of meaning. Mcaning is solncthing always t o be achieved, striving for unrealized potcntial. And, it is il learning
space only for "those who wish and know how to think participativcly" (Dakbtin,
1993, p. 19) expcriencccl as a "kind of nlental activity which characterizes mental
growth and, hence, the educative process" (Dewey, 1904, p. 22).
Finding accorclai~cewith the vital movement of the whole entails [inding
tlircction within the movement, a knowing in aclion irrlirril~tclyand ricccssarily
related within the lnovelneilt itself (Dewey, 1938, p. 20). Failure to take t l ~ ctnovitigji)l~eof expcric~~ce
illto account betrays experience. Sucfi betrayals ma~lifcst
themselves through focusing on cnds, ignoring the elements of knowing within
experience. Dewey (1938) met this betrayal of experience in the misinterprctatiom of his thinking often stripping experiencc of its dynamic unfolding and undel.going character. Thus, he wrote of the tzecd of o rlreory of'cxpcrierrcc (p. 25).
I3akhtin sougl~tsuch a theory too, keenly aware that the rational and se~lsuous
E&C 4~ Education and Culture
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ilspects ofo u r being arc in a constant stiite of reciprocity. It seems both Bakhtin
ilncl Llcwey value temporality and interplay as givens to be worked wit11 and simultaneously working as dynan~icpractices, permeating the act of creating
~neaning.Synthesizing my seilrches wit11 Uakhtin and Dewey, I find temporality
arld illtcrplay to hold the following interdependent consequences for the nature
o f design, its orgrunization, form and ensuing relationships, giving expression to
the bearingsllivecl terms of designing:
Design-a

discourse by nature

Embodying the very unicluc, personal, humanness of meaning making, Itnowledge rcsicles in self-experience. 'The act of knowing entails a "reorganizing or reconstruction of experience" (Llewey, 1934, p. 76), past informing present, with
ilnplications for the future. This temporal reorganizing/reconstructing process is
likened l o a dialogue between sell' and other. The discourse entered into becomes
the design. The L.atin root of ~liscourscis disctirstls, a running about. The implied
sense of movement i111ri the unique experience of this running are integral considerations, 'T'hus, a pattern of tl-iought acknowledging the interplay of context,
tirnc, ancl personal experience grows, becoming the necessary link to sense making, suggesting a clesign organization and form.
Organization-inquiry

guided

'I'hc temporal discourse Ilaklitin (1993) ancl Dewey (1934, 1938) give expression
to is not simply interactive, it entails dwelling within context. The relational interplay must be attended to fro111 within the search for meaning. I am reminded
of Maxine Grecne's (1988) "rlialectic oj'jredoni," in which "one's reality rather
than being fixed and precleGned is a perpetual emergent, becoming increasingly
~nultiyjcx,as m o r e perspcctivcs are taken, Inore texts are opened, more friendships are macle" (p. 23). 'This crncrgcnt nature characterizes the organization in
the making, derived frorn the irlcluiry itself. Most importantly, transformation
occurs with ill1 clnangir~gin the process. This is Gadamer's (1992) understanding
of play us clisti~lctfrom self and other. lllay is its own experience, reuniting
means and erlds, ~eelianton the performance (y. 134). It is the performance, the
13aklitinian clct a n d the Deweyan cxl)erienccthat has a spirit of its own which participants Inust attcncI to anti take up. The reciprocal interaction and modification entailed, transforms mcnnings in the making.
Form-a

narrative way of knowing

T h e act of creating meaning is socially motivated, socially embedded, and derived l'~-omthe personal narratives of experience. Narrative is a form where the
interplay o f time, place, experience, and personal knowledge call be represented
fully. ?'he relations, connections, and interactions tire parts of the whole. Unity is
soruething bod1 Uaklltin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) see revealed in the form
of the action as il whole. Nassativc demands such a search for unity, evolvillg and
Volume 21(2) =@ 2005
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reforming as k~lowledgeis collstructed and generated. Therefore, to talk of the
actlexperience of creating lneaning talces a narrative form, acknowledging the
~nultiplicityof knowing and the dialectical rclationshiys involved.
Inherently and necessarily relational

Implicit within design, and its organization, and fonn arc ~nultiplcintcrscctillg
rclations holding the potential to generate the ongoing dcsigning mavenlent of
thought. Ualthtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) do not characterizc this movement i11 any way as arbitrary, and yet uncertainty is integral to the process. The
differences between arbitrariness and ernbracing ur~cert.aintiesare important :\nd
need to be examined more fully. Neither Uakhtin nor 1)cwcy suggests iI predetermined plan. Arbitrariness denies the existence of relationships with no acknowledgemel~tof what particularities bring to situations. It is aimless, at the
mercy of fortuitous evcnts. It does not loolc back or ahead, with no cncl in sight.
Thus it assumes a carefree, careless abandonment to the monlcnt. Arbitrariness
is characterized as thoughtless and reckless. Embracing uncertainties is distinguished from arbitrariness through its deliberate nature. This delibcrt~tenalurc
does not entail a predetermined and fixed purpose, though. 12athcr, dccisions are
dcrived fro111 within situations demanding receptivity to sensory qualities and relatiorls between self and other o n an ongoing basis. In other words, the irrvcr~tion
and creation of lncalling is sought. A spirit of inquiry cnlergcs of its ow11 volition. This centers o n discovery, with this neither being an objcct or a concept,
but a deliberate, ongoing search conconlitantly seeking and giving self lo thc crciltion. Such seeking and giving of self e~nbraccsmeans and encls. Llcwey (1934)
talks of the arlist assuming the attitude of the perceiver while involvcd in the
maki11g process, Only as ends and means arc taken logether, made part of one's
response, can this form a continuurn. Embracing uncertaintics is necesw~rilyprcsent acting as a catalyst. Space for speculation, projection, the unanticipated,
guides and provides direction. Embracing uncertaintics as strength is the catalyst
sustaining the movement integral to both Dcwey's and Dalchtin's thinking. And
as Dewcy (1916) claims, "This is a doctrine of humility; but it is also a iloctrinc
of direction. For it tells us to open the eyes and cars of the mind, to bc sensitivc
to all the varied pliases of life and history" (pp. 11-12). So, arbilrariness is not
present. Embracing uncertairlties through discernment is a better fit as both
Uewcy and Uakhtin convey a relational designing lnovcmctlt as a discourse by
nature. The designing ~novelnentis inquiry guided, narra~ivcin for111,and inherently relational, concomitantly seeing, thinking, doing, and i~ctingresponsibly.

Dynamics of Design: Seeing and Repetition
Designing through discern~nentrequires sensitivity to il mcdium as a medium
(Dewey, 1934, p. 199). IL asks us to attend to "that which appears qualitatively
and focally at a particular moment" (Dewey, 1926, p. 7), taking an intcrcst in
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t h a t which appears. Intcrcstcdness is about being in the middle of tliings-the
s]>iIce found between sclf anrl other clcrivecl frorii within the act of participation.
A ~ i d such
,
participation is always extending bind enlarging rlerived from tlie bearings disclosed within tlie movenient. Uaklltin (1990) characterizes sucli participation through his intcrrelatecl notions of nirswcrnbiliry, o~rtsitienessand cllljirlalizahility. Ilewey (1934) cl~aracterizcs such participation through his
ir~tcrrelatetlnotions of ~loirtgand rrrrdergoitzg. Undergirding both charocterizations is the notion of rcpcliric~tr,Repetition is n notion that Risser (1997, p. 34)
traces back ro Arisrotlc (1925). liepetition is disc~isscdas a turn and re-tun1 to
self understurrding, acting on possibilities. Acknowledging and working witli
temporality and interplay demands repetition. Risser explains that in "this te111poral tnovclnent of the sclf toward its future possibilities, one recommits oneself
to the possibilities that arc recognized as one's own" where "past possibilities of
a c t i o l ~become fiiture pessibilities and arc repeatecl in the iiloment of decision"
(p. 38). 'I'hus, Ilisser conclucles that repetilion is "fundamentally dynamic" (p.
39). In so doing, he clearly distinguishes dynamic repetition (creative and life
giving) from static repetition (repeating the same). It is dynamic repetition that 1
see iis the central task of tledgning. C:rei~tingmeaning enrails coming to unclerstand cliffercntly, ilnd thus concomitantly, creating ant1 re-creating sclf. This rcpctitive movement is ii continuous process af conling to see; a backward movcnicnL that recovers anrl re-presents alongside a forwartl movernent that generates
and cvolccs. I'erliiips, the role and place of repetitive seeing as the source of the
movement is what hiis been repci~tccllymisintcrpretccl and misunderstood, betrayi~igtlesign its 11 nloving force. Cars (2000) alludes to this iclentifying technicist and non-tcchnicist seeing its the crux of "much confusion in eclucetinnal debate" (p. 70). Seeing taken up in a technicist manner ignores the particularities
of contcxt and follows proccdurcs to n pre-given end. 'I'hus, technicist secing rcduccs action to prcdcfined bcliavior, substituting Gnitc goals for transformational tliiiilcing, and replacing juclgment with predetcr~nincdrules a11d skills.
IGlthcr, non-teclinicist seeing considers what is at stake in a situation. This is not
a generalizable iniposed wisdom but rather spccific to u moment, unanticipated.
And, most importnntly, furthers the movement of thought in self and others.
But, tlic repetitive seeing cntailecl in entering iis (1 creator into designing most
i m p ~ r t i ~ n tpositions
ly
t l ~ ccreator to see with potential involving il curious interplay between self and crtlier, between creating ant1 being created. I'otcntial refers
to Gadamer's (1992) insistence that
Altl~ougl~
it is necessary to see what a situation is iislcing of us, this seeing
does not mean that we pcrceivc in tlie situation what is visible as such,
but tllat we le'lrn to see il as t11e situation ofiiction and hence in the light
o f what is right. (1'. 322)
I use "curious" to acknowledge tllc emborliecl particularities of sucli exchanges
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illat cannot reoccur. Tile interplay discloses ways of seeing living wilhin the
movement. It is
dynalnic and transforn~iltioni~l
undcssta~iclingof' ~~cpctitive
seeillg that is missing, more apt to be undermined, the movement is thwarted.
This is w]ly Dewey (1938)
distinguishes between crlucutivc and miseducative experience (p. 75). And, Balchtin (1993) cdnnot imi~gincliving in a
world where contellt is imposed: "In that world I ill11 unnece.ssilr.y, I a n CSSCJItially and fu~ldamentallynon-existe~ltin it" (p. 9 ) .
TIle lilll< between repetitive seeing and its potential fclr. the L'iiturc is the
Inoral grounding that takes repetition beyond simply a n~cthodtrlogil.i~l,
thcoretical, o r philosoyhical consideration. What gets protluccd is other; I)cyontl what
might be given, or specified in advance by theory, or guarutitcccl by method. It
assumes a concerll wit11 what it is that ought to be cl011~;I: rnotlc ot. W ~ oFbcing
Y
in the world elltailing p~lrsuitof the good. Anti, s11c.ha scil~chfat' the gootl is always in ilnmediale relationsllip to the wllolc arising from the particulars of situation and returning to situation. It is not about gazing out upon iUI cxtcrrt,rl world
applying meaning but rather meaning in the making dccrnerl littirig to situations
on an on going basis. Caputo (1987) is l~clpfiilhcrc arguing that the story or
much methodology, theory, ant1 philosophy has been to "still the llux, to contain
its course, to asrest its play" (p. 257). Instci~dhc proposes ;In "cthics oC ctissemination" awakening us to the play, fostering a "fresh cut into tllc co~nplcxityof
the situations wc face" (y. 261). Caputo cxpluins thilt iln ctllics of clisscttlination
"requires the hardiness ol repetitiol~" . . to instill motion tlii~tis "Ilcxihlc, in
flux, reformable, responding forward" (p. 263). 'Shcrc is both i\ vigilant husl?icisn
and a concern for attending to the play itself that crln l ~ copcri~~ion,llizccl
only
tl~rougha community engaged in an ongoing ciiscoiirsc, Openness to possibility
is key. There is a nloral obligation to thc fttturc, to gcncriitivity, to tlic possiblc
that what is "wl~ollyother" (Caputo, 2000) might remilin so.

.

Conclusion
Discovery and inventio~lyield design, bringing forth i1 1'1ngible ftrr~n.'I'hcrc is little room for exploring designing as bcit~g-i~~-~hc-worIcl
whcrc rigill rilles dictate
the way in which design shoulcl bc represenlctl. l-imir,~tions u~ttluly impingc
upon or restrict the possibilities for clcsigning. 1)csign CIS I~cing-in- he-world
comes from playing with possibilities, starching for rcl,itiot~ship~.
'1"llc tlcvclepment of such thinlcing in situation ;~llowsfor tlic discovcry of pc)tcnti,il. It permits possibilities to be included as the search cvolvcs. Without ,I ~ z l , ~fill
y .spirit it
would seem that imaginative thought, rccluiring sl)ccul,~tion,in11 co~ljcctur.ing
about possibilities, might not be possible. So as cclucatos.s linll ~hcn~sclvcs
c,lugh[
up i n the immediacy of given situations, they arc conf'~*ontedwith citllcr contriving encounters to fit a fixed idea or acting o n ,I openness to new itlctis ~ n c an
i acceptance of alternatives through listening a11d rcspontling to the j>,~rticul~rritics
of
contexts. Belief in the worthiness of the latter ,~ppro,lc.llto ~1esig11
trC~tl~l,~tcs
illto
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greater comlnii~nenllo scilrch for these consideralions in their designing practices. 'I'hc act o f creating mciuning ~nilkesvisible the bearings of its own visibility.
'The beilrings lie in constantly cluestioning what we see and thinlc about the world
as it opens up.
+-.
I he process becomes i~searcll for intentionality that articulates a different
mode of design rooted within its artistic traditions; one that is reflexive, an interchange of interpretations asking all involvecl to contirlualIy revise and enlarge
underslandings. ?his mat~ifestingchi~rilcterassurnes a mode of design understood as coming into beillg, rcliilllt on l 1 1 ~relational complexities coming together in particular teaching/leurning situations a r ~ dthe ongoing conte~nplation
of these relations. It restores the participatory, active nature to design taking life
as a movenlcrlt of thought. 13akIitin (1990,1993) and Dewey (1934,1938) denote
<tesign henrings (hilt c nu st he liccdcd, providing images and voc;ibulaly to see
anew. 'I'hc act of designing sllapes and guides from wilhin meariing making, taking its b e a r i ~ ~ gfrom
s tllc particularities coming togctller, concolnitantly aware of
circumstunces i1nt1 the potctltial of those circumstances. Such a repetitive movement seeks out and seizes back possibilities in life. Designing accordillgly entails
seeing the concrete situatio~las it is, and as it might be.
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